摘 要：作为现代道德理论的一个基本形态，后果主义的标准形式同时坚持“最大化合理性”和“不偏不倚的和非个人的行动理由”这两个基本的主张，然而，“反理论”的思想家和道义论者分别对后果主义的这两个主张发起了关键性的攻击。谢夫勒为发展一种免受攻击的后果主义所提出的方案并不能在根本上令人满意，因为那个方案并没有彻底打发掉后果主义身上据说注定隐藏了的“行动者中立”的立场。但是，对后果主义背后隐含的这个假定的观察实际上只是一种夸大其辞的说法，后果主义道德理论所坚持的具有客观地位的理由，既可以在“行动者中立”的框架内获得理解，也可以在“行动者中心”的框架内获得理解。
关键词：标准后果主义； 理由； 最大化合理性； 个人观点
Maximizing Rationality, Personal Standpoint and Moral Reason
ZHANG Xi
Abstract: A standard consequentialist commits two basic points. He thinks of both maximizing rationality and impartial standpoint as his theoretical presumptions. But when he connects the impartial standpoint with the impersonal reason for action, some scholars will deny the validness of this connection because of its alleged features of overdemanding and integrity-breaking. Samuel Scheffler has developed an ambitious strategy to reconcile the presumption of maximizing rationality and the status of personal reason for action in practical deliberation. I will inquire into his work and argue against its faults.
Key Words: standard consequentialism; reason; maximizing rationality; personal standpoint
