摘 要： 胡塞尔的《逻辑研究》没有将“时间”与“发生”置于某种联系、哪怕是对立的联系之中。只是从个别的零散论述中可以看出胡塞尔对“时间分析”的关注和对“发生分析”的排斥。但《内时间意识现象学讲座》对“时间分析”与“发生分析”的态度则有改变。胡塞尔在这里将这两者放在一起讨论，并试图把握它们之间的内在联系。此后，他在《笛卡尔式的沉思》期间对“时间”与“发生”问题的思考，表现为一种对静态现象学（对“横意向性”的分析）与发生现象学（对“纵意向性”的分析）关系的讨论。这个思考很可能是导致胡塞尔可以在《笛卡尔式的沉思》把“时间”看作“所有本我论发生的普全形式”的原因。从这里出发，历史问题也开始，尤其是在《欧洲科学的危机与超越论的现象学》中，以一种与时间与发生内在相关的方式进入胡塞尔的视野,包括历史研究的方式与历史研究的范围、历史与 “时间”、“发生”的内在关联，以及“形式的”和“内容的”历史现象学的可能联系与区别。
关键词： 时间现象学； 发生现象学； 历史现象学； 内在关联
Longitudinal-Intentionality: Time, Genesis, History
Husserl’s Understanding of their Immanent Relationship
NI Liang-kang
Abstract: Time, genesis and history are three different phenomena, but obvious immanent relationship among them is in existence. Husserl’s understanding of this relationship has undergone a gradual process in his study of phenomenology. In brief, in Logical Investigations and his early analysis of inner time-consciousness, Husserl in principle set aside questions concerning genesis and history; but in his late analysis of time and Cartesian Meditations, he often combined the three to have a general and coherent analysis, and finally realized his phenomenology of history in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. The present author hereby attempts to trace this tendency of his thought and the reason behind it. This paper also raises question as to whether his late attempt would succeed or not. Besides, the attempt made here can generally be seen as an introduction to Husserl’s conceiving of genetic phenomenology and phenomenology of history starting with phenomenology of time.
Key words: phenomenology of time; genetic phenomenology; phenomenology of history; immanent relationship
