摘 要： 要使我们涉及他人的行为具有道德上的恰当性，我们就必须理解我们特定行为之特定对象的独特性。理解是解释学的一个核心课题，而当代解释学的一个重要教条就是，在理解一个对象时，我们不仅不可能，而且没必要像我们的理解对象对自身的理解那样来理解他们，因为我们对我们的理解对象的理解可以比他们的自我理解更好。如果这样，我们在从事涉及他人的行为时，就无需考虑他们的自我理解，而只要依据我们对他们的理解，不管这样的理解与他们的自我理解是否相同。这在我看来是不正确的。因此我以宗教理解为例子，运用当代分析哲学家戴维森的“第一人称的权威”概念来说明：一方面，为什么我们对他者的理解必须以他者的自我理解为权威；另一方面，我们对他者的理解怎么可能达到他者的自我理解的程度。
关键词： 戴维森； 第一人称的权威； 理解他者； 还原论； 反还原论
Understanding of the Other: Davidson’s First Person Authority
HUANG Yong
Abstract: In order for our actions affecting others to be morally appropriate, it is important for us to understand the uniqueness of the particular moral patient of our particular action. While understanding is the central topic of hermeneutics, one of the most important dogmas of contemporary hermeneutics is that it is neither necessary nor possible to understand the other as the other understands himself/herself, as it is both possible and important for us to understand the other better than the other understands himself/herself. If so, when we deliberate our actions affecting others, we only need rely on our understanding of others, even if it is very different from or even contradictory to the others’ self-understanding. I think this is wrong. In this paper, using the religious understanding (understanding of religious believers) as an example, I develop Donald Davidson’s idea of the first person authority to show, on the one hand, why our understanding of others should be checked with the others’ understanding of themselves, and, on the other hand, how it is possible to understand the others as well as they understand themselves.
Key words: Donald Davidson; the first person authority; understanding of the other; reductionism; anti-reductionism
