摘 要：人类对个人行为的批判性反思能力往往被认为与自由和责任问题相关。在哲学中，这种观点体现为对认识的能动性的主张。然而这种主张事实上面临着多重困难。首先，这种对知识反思的要求会导致无穷回归这一严重后果。第二，有一种观点认为，由于反思为决断提供了可靠的保证，从而有助于区分异己的欲望和真正属于认知者的欲望，然而反思自身的可靠性却是有问题的。此外，关于第一人称视角、谨慎思考以及认识的责任感的主张并不足以使认识的能动性的讨论合法化。这些关于认识的能动性的几种动机都不同程度地预设了某些关于反思的断言，而实际上，这些断言却与现今的最有用的证据相左。据此，目前对认识的能动性概念的诸多论述和辩护方式都是有问题的。
关键词： 欲望； 信念获得； 无穷回归； 反思的能动者； 谨慎思考； 认识的责任感
Epistemic Agency
Hilary Kornblith
Abstract: The ability of human beings to critically assess his or her actions, on certain views, is related to the issues about freedom and responsibility. In philosophy, this claim is reflected in the idea of epistemic agency. However, this idea confronts a number of difficulties. Firstly, reflective assessment of knowledge would lead to a severe problem, i.e., the infinite regress. Secondly, some authors hold the view that reflection is able to provide reliable source for our judgment, which would help distinguish desires which are alien from those which are truly our own. Nonetheless, the reliability of reflection itself is questionable. In addition, the support from views of first-person perspective, deliberation and epistemic responsibility also cannot legitimize talk of epistemic agency. It is shown that these several motivations for taking talk of epistemic agency seriously presuppose a variety of empirical claims about reflection which run counter to our best available evidence. Accordingly, most arguments and justifications for epistemic agency at present are problematic.
Key words: desire; belief acquisition; infinite regress; the reflective agent; deliberation; epistemic responsibility
