摘 要： 布兰顿的规范性实践概念主张一种“理性主义的实用主义”立场。这对关于规范性的社会科学哲学具有重要意义。只有依赖于“理性空间的社会化”，才能说明：（1）因果事件等非规范性存在如何能进入规范性理解的视域；（2）隐性规则如何既能前反思性地引导行动者，又能具备清晰阐释的可能性；（3）规范性解释的有效性如何既是客观的，又是在交往实践中可修正的；因而，理性主义的实用主义观点才能在社会科学哲学的层面构建独立自足的规范性概念。
关键词： 规范性实践； 布兰顿； 实用主义； 社会科学哲学
中图分类号：B089 文献标志码：A 文章编号：2095-0047（2011）04-0029-13
On the Conceptual Relation Between Normativity in Brandom’s Theory and
in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
XU Zhu
Abstract: The Rationalist Pragmatism has been claimed in Robert Brandom’s thought of normative practice. This article argues that the questions as following could be answered successfully only within the conceptual framework in terms of socialization of “ the logic space of reasons”. First, how could non-normative reality, for instance, causal events, be understood normatively? Second, how could implicit rules which usually direct actors unreflectively be possible to be explicated explicitly? Finally, how could normative interpretation in social sciences be objectively valid while also revisable in the foregoing practice of communication? Rationalist Pragmatism actually constructs a self-contained conception of normativity by answering those three questions.
Key Words: normative practice; Robert Brandom; Pragmatism; Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
